- A court injunction froze the strongest form of derivative protection in Brazil, blocking margin calls, early termination and fiduciary collateral execution
- Ambipar’s hedge structure amplified its own liquidity stress, with collateral requirements tied to falling bond prices, turning a protection mechanism into a destabilizing spiral
- The Central Bank warns the ruling threatens systemic FX‑hedge stability across $134bn in corporate positions
The Central Bank of Brazil has asked a Rio de Janeiro bankruptcy court to reverse an injunction that froze derivative collateral in Ambipar‘s judicial restructuring, warning that the ruling undermines the legal protections designed to prevent contagion in the financial system.
The development has put the market on high alert. RGF Associados partner Claudio Damasceno told 9fin that the case exposes a structural weak spot in Brazil’s insolvency framework, noting that judicial intervention in margin and collateral rules can reverberate across the hedge market.
In a petition filed earlier in July, the monetary authority sought admission as amicus curiae in Ambipar’s judicial reorganization, arguing that suspending margin calls, accelerated maturity and collateral execution threatens the stability of the foreign exchange (FX) hedge market and contradicts the statutory safe harbor for derivatives.
Ambipar’s dispute with Deutsche Bank centers on a series of DI‑Dollar swaps originally contracted with Bank of America between 29 February and 4 March 2024, with a notional value of BRL 3.74bn ($710m).
The swaps were transferred to Deutsche on 18 February 2025 and renegotiated into four contracts maturing in 2031. As the company’s liquidity deteriorated, Ambipar deposited roughly BRL 170m ($32m) in margin through bank certificates of deposits (CDBs) under fiduciary assignment.
Deutsche Bank closed the swaps on 22 October 2025 and declared itself creditor of BRL 208.6m ($40m). Ambipar filed a precautionary measure in September 2025, followed by a full judicial restructuring (RJ) request the following month, citing the pressure of margin calls and the risk of cross‑default across BRL 10.7bn ($2bn) in obligations.
The court initially authorized Deutsche Bank to close the swaps and execute the fiduciary collateral. A later injunction suspended accelerated maturity and barred execution of derivative guarantees, ordering Deutsche to replace a bank guarantee of more than BRL 200m ($38m) issued by Santander with a cash deposit.
In its filing, the central bank said the forced substitution “diminishes the liquidity of the financial institution and may interfere with its capacity to fulfill contracts with third parties,” adding that judicial intervention in margin models calculated under regulatory standards can trigger unpredictable chain reactions in asset prices and investor behavior.
The injunction also collided directly with article 193‑A of Brazil’s bankruptcy law, introduced in 2020 to shield derivatives and repos from the stay period. The provision ensures that early termination, netting and collateral execution remain available even after a restructuring is filed.
The Central Bank argued that suspending these rights contradicts the statute’s purpose of containing systemic risk and preventing the spread of losses through interdependent market positions.
A hedge structure that amplified stress
Ambipar’s hedge contained a structural feature that intensified the company’s liquidity strain. RGF’s Damasceno pointed to addendum dated 18 August 2025 tied the collateral requirement to the market price of Ambipar’s own bonds. As bond prices fell, margin calls increased, worsening liquidity and pushing prices down further. Damasceno described the mechanism as a spiral that turned a hedge into a source of instability.
While the Central Bank’s petition does not address this contractual feature, it reinforces the regulator’s argument that derivative guarantees are calculated through rigid risk models and should not be altered by judicial discretion. The Central Bank’s petition notes that margin requirements under Brazil’s National Monetary Council regulations are designed to mitigate counterparty risk and align Brazil’s framework with post‑2008 international standards.
Damasceno said the Ambipar dispute “put the safe harbor of article 193‑A to the test for the first time in a case of major visibility.”
The injunction, he explained, effectively subordinated the special rule protecting derivatives to the general principle of preserving the company, reintroducing judicial review of margin timing that the 2020 reform was designed to eliminate.
He noted that derivative collateral can carry dual protection when structured as fiduciary property and covered by article 193‑A. Freezing such collateral signals that no guarantee is truly safe if the strongest shield can be suspended, he added.
Systemic stakes far beyond Ambipar
The systemic stakes are substantial. The Central Bank’s filing cites BRL 707bn ($134bn) in FX hedge positions held by 53 financial institutions with 8,513 corporate counterparties. Deutsche Bank alone maintained BRL 16.9bn ($3.2bn) in FX swap and forward positions with 73 companies.
The regulator said the injunction threatens the functioning of the FX and capital markets by undermining the predictability of margin and collateral rules.
Damasceno said the episode touches the “nerve of netting opinions,” the legal assessments that allow international banks to treat exposures on a net basis. Any uncertainty over the enforceability of netting and collateral could raise capital requirements, widen spreads and push hedge booking offshore.
The RGF partner expects hedge costs to rise as banks demand more initial margin and apply higher credit valuation adjustments. Weakening the safe harbor, he said, “makes the hedge more expensive for everyone,” particularly mid‑sized companies that rely on onshore swaps to manage FX exposure.
Damasceno also warned that the logic of freezing derivative collateral could spill into other structures such as fiduciary assignments, cash collateral and receivables‑backed financing, not by changing their legal nature but by delaying access to collateral during the stay period. That temporal erosion, he argued, is enough to reprice credit and collateral across the market.
Ambipar didn’t reply to request for comment.






